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Abstract
Using the April 2020 Current Population Survey (CPS) micro dataset, we explore the racialized and gendered effects of
the COVID-19 pandemic on the probability of being unemployed. The distribution of the pandemic-induced job losses
for women and men or for different racial/ethnic categories has been studied in the recent literature. We contribute to
this literature by providing an intersectional analysis of unemployment under COVID-19, where we examine the
differences in the likelihood of unemployment across groups of White men, White women, Black men, Black women,
Hispanic men, and Hispanic women. As a case of study of the COVID-19 recession, our work engages with the broader
empirical literature testing the discrimination theories based on the unexplained gap after accounting for observable
characteristics of women, men, and different races/ethnicities and their labor market positions. Controlling for individual
characteristics such as education and age, as well as industry and occupation effects, we show that women of all three
racial/ethnic categories are more likely to be unemployed compared to men, yet there are substantial differences across
these groups based on different unemployment measures. Hispanic women have the highest likelihood of being unem-
ployed, followed by Black women, who are still more likely to be unemployed than White women. We also examine if
the ability to work from home has benefited any particular group in terms of lowering their likelihood of unemployment
during the pandemic. We find that in industries with a high degree of teleworkable jobs, White women, Black men, and
Hispanic men are no longer more likely to be unemployed relative to White men. However, Black women and Hispanic
Women still experience a significantly higher probability of job loss compared to White men even if they are employed
in industries with highly teleworkable jobs. As we control for both individual and aggregate factors, our results suggest
that these differences are not simply the result of overrepresentation of women of color in certain industries and
occupations; rather, unobservable factors such as discrimination could be at work.
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Introduction
Race and gender disparities in labor market outcomes have
been a persistent feature of the US labor markets. The labor
market experiences of women and men of different races and
ethnicities are reflected in the differences in labor force par-
ticipation rates, median wages, the occupations, and industries
they work in. The intersection of gender and race shapes these
experiences heavily to the disadvantage of women and non-
White race and ethnicities.1 Specifically, Latina and Black
women have been found to be paid lower wages (Browne
1 Throughout this paper, we will use BLS categories of Whites, African
Americans, and Hispanics. African Americans and Blacks, and Hispanics
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1999), overrepresented in low-paying occupations (Altonji
and Blank 1999), ranked low in occupational hierarchies,
and lacking job authority (Browne et al. 2001). To explain
these outcomes, the feminist literature emphasizes the inter-
section of race and gender as mutually constituted to maintain
social hierarchies (Browne and Misra 2003). Intersectional
feminist theorists also suggest that discrimination by em-
ployers (Weber 2001) and/or customers and coworkers (Bell
and Nkomo 2001) results in and reproduces the social hierar-
chy matrix by race and gender. Economic theories, on the
other hand, often conceptualize race and gender differences
in the labor market through disconnected models. In
explaining these differences, they focus on individual prefer-
ences and skills (human capital) as well as differences in labor
market position (industry, occupation, and region) (Altonji
and Blank 1999). In empirical applications of these studies,
discrimination is taken to be the residual difference that exists
in labor market outcomes which cannot be explained by these
factors (Altonji and Blank 1999).
The increase in the national unemployment rate in the USA
due to the COVID-19 pandemic and social distancing mea-
sures, from 4.4 in March 2020 to 14.7%2 in April 2020, has
been the most recent example of asymmetrical impacts across
different race and gender categories of the labor force. In line
with the emphasis of the intersectional approaches mentioned
above, the increase in the unemployment rate was particularly
prominent for women and non-White races and ethnicities. In
January 2020, the unemployment rate was 3.3% for White
men, 2.9% for White women, 6.1% for Black men, 5.8% for
Black women, 4.9% for Hispanic men, and 5.3% for Hispanic
women. By June 2020, the unemployment rate had reached
9.4% for White men, 10.8% for White women, 16.6% for
Black men, 14.3% for Black women, 13.3% for Hispanic
men, and 16.1% for Hispanic women (BLS 2020). As data
became available, a growing literature began to examine the
determinants and distributional consequences of pandemic-
related job losses for women and men (Alon et al. 2020;
Adams-Prassl et al. 2020) and for different racial/ethnic cate-
gories (Montenovo et al. 2020; Fairlie et al. 2020; Cowan
2020). While these studies all agree that women’s unemploy-
ment increased substantially more than men’s during the pan-
demic, findings on the effects on racial/ethnic groups are not
as conclusive, with some finding a large impact for Blacks
(Cowan 2020) and others suggesting the impact to be larger
for Latinx (Montenovo et al. 2020).
In this paper, we analyze the pandemic-induced unemploy-
ment differences by race and gender, as observed in April
2020 CPS data, to examine whether there exists a higher like-
lihood of becoming unemployed for Black and Hispanic
women after controlling for labor force characteristics (educa-
tion and age), as well as their labor market position (industry,
occupation, and region). With its empirical framework, our
work contributes to the broader economic literature on race
and/or gender differentials in labor market outcomes by pro-
viding a case study of the differential impact of the COVID-
19-induced recession. The emphasis put forward by intersec-
tional feminist theorists plays an essential role in our ap-
proach. Instead of analyzing group differences of race and
gender separately and risking the generalization of White
women’s unemployment as the experience of women of all
races, or disregarding the differences in a Black woman’s
experience in comparison to a Black man’s, we utilize inter-
sectional groups of White men, White women, Black men,
Black women, Hispanic men, and Hispanic women to study
these differences.
Our analysis reveals a more nuanced picture of the
COVID-19 unemployment that has already been labeled as a
“she-cession” in the popular press (Gupta 2020). We confirm
that women of all three racial/ethnic categories are more likely
to become unemployed compared to men, yet there are sub-
stantial differences across these groups under different unem-
ployment measures. As expected, the additional disadvantage
of women of color is again realized, even after controlling for
all individual- and industry-level observable factors, with
Hispanic women experiencing the highest likelihood of un-
employment, followed by Black women, who are still more
likely to be unemployed thanWhite women.We also find that
although Hispanic men have a higher probability of losing
their jobs compared to White men, this probability is even
higher for Black men. Overall, our results clarify the incon-
clusive findings of other studies about whether Blacks or
Latinx are more profoundly affected by the COVID-19-
induced unemployment.
The recession that began in March 2020 differs greatly
from prior recessions, specifically in terms of the industries
affected. Within the essential/non-essential classification of
industries, some service industries that have traditionally been
considered less cyclical came to a complete halt, while some
of the typically cyclical manufacturing industries continued to
operate. The feasibility of working from home became a cru-
cial determinant of who gets to keep their job, and a number of
studies developed measures of the feasibility of working from
home for various occupations (Dingel and Neiman 2020). As
emphasized by the literature on the differential effects of re-
cessions on the unemployment of different groups, industrial
and occupational segregation is an important mechanism that
results in asymmetric outcomes. In order to capture these
pandemic-specific effects on unemployment, we use measures
for the degree of teleworkable jobs in an industry, as well as
whether the industry is deemed essential or not. Since employ-
ment in industries with more teleworkable jobs can provide
shelter from unemployment, we explore if the ability to work
from home has benefited Black and Hispanic women by low-
ering the likelihood of unemployment during the pandemic.2 Bureau of Labor Statistics 2020 - Hereinafter BLS
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We find that, even though White women, Black men, and
Hispanic men are no longer more likely to be unemployed
relative to White men in industries with a high degree of
teleworkability, Black women and Hispanic women still ex-
perience a significantly higher probability of losing their jobs,
even when employed in industries with highly teleworkable
jobs.
In the “What We Know About Racial and Gender Gaps in
Unemployment Over the Business Cycle” section, we review
the economic theories that explain why recessions may result
in race and gender disparities in unemployment. This review
highlights the importance of occupational and industrial seg-
regation, as well as discrimination, as mechanisms through
which different groups disproportionately lose their jobs. We
also show that some of the important insights from the litera-
ture, such as the lessening of the gender gap in unemployment
over time or the relative adverse effect of recessions on men’s
unemployment, are not necessarily valid for all racial/ethnic
groups, which affirms a need for intersectional analysis. In the
“Racialized-Gendered Unemployment Under the COVID-19
Recession” section, we review the existing studies of COVID-
19-related unemployment with a focus on the unemployment
of women and people of color. Here, we discuss the studies on
the types of jobs and industries with teleworking opportunities
against the background of the pandemic and pose the question
of whether Black and Hispanic women have benefited from
the se oppo r t un i t i e s . The “Da ta on COVID-19
Unemployment” section describes the dataset, two different
definitions of COVID-19-related unemployment, as well as
the characteristics of the unemployed based on these defini-
tions. In the “Regression and Results” section, we present our
empirical framework and the results from probit regression,
wherein we measure the relative likelihood of unemployment
across racial/ethnic-gender categories, given the controlling
variables mentioned above. In this section, we also test for
the interaction between racial/ethnic-gender categories and
the degree of teleworkability in industries. The “Concluding
Remarks” section then presents a discussion and concluding
remarks.
WhatWeKnowAbout Racial and Gender Gaps
in Unemployment Over the Business Cycle
There are two prominent lines of work in the theoretical liter-
ature on race and gender disparities in labor market outcomes:
the first focuses on the differences in individual preferences
across members of different groups, and the second examines
discrimination as the main mechanism through which gender
and race disparities emerge (Altonji and Blank 1999). In both
strands of the literature, researchers study either race or gender
distinctively (Altonji and Blank 1999); here, we broadly re-
view each approach to shed light on the mechanisms through
which recessions may result in further disparities in unem-
ployment across different groups.
Frequently deployed to explain gender differentials in labor
market outcomes, the first approach argues that preferences
for market, non-market work and leisure, and/or particular
types of work will be different for women and men (Rosen
1986). This type of self-selection results in occupational and
industrial segregation, where women are overrepresented in
certain occupations and/or industries. Consequently, the
asymmetric impact of recessions across industries and occu-
pations leads to differential employment outcomes for men
and women. The main criticism of this approach is that pref-
erences are taken to be exogeneous. Without any exploration
of the sources of gendered preferences, this view ignores, for
instance, the pre-market gender discrimination in child rearing
and/or the educational system (Altonji and Blank 1999).
An alternative argument within this line of work, as argued
by Becker (1991), suggests that in a competitive economy,
comparative advantage stemming from biological differences
determines the time allocation across occupations and among
market and non-market work. Models emphasizing human
capital also state that investment in valuablemarketplace skills
will be lower among those who expect to spend less time in
the marketplace (Altonji and Blank 1999). As women are
expected to have a lower labor force attachment due to dis-
ruptions during childbearing years, employers invest less hu-
man capital in women, further amplifying the divergence in
the human capital of men and women. In addition, women’s
educational choices might reflect their expectation of lower
labor force attachment. Low investment in human capital re-
sults in occupational and industrial segregation, which in turn
explains the asymmetric impact of recessions on the employ-
ment of men and women. However, this approach also has
been criticized for emphasizing the role of voluntary choices
and ignoring the role of socialization and gender in determin-
ing to a certain extent people’s choices and preferences (Blau
and Winkler 2017).
The comparative advantage approach, coupled with human
capital theory, also provides an explanation for racial occupa-
tional segregation. Altonji and Blank (1999) state that to the
extent that parents in particular occupations provide children
with a comparative advantage in these occupations, below-
average representation of minority groups in managerial jobs
may lower the probability that minority youths obtain the
skills required to hold these jobs in the future. Likewise, the
economic prospects of minorities have dropped when school
quality has been lower in neighborhoods disproportionately
populated by minorities. These differences in the level of hu-
man capital, acquired prior to labor force entry or in-home
environment, would not only contribute to racial unemploy-
ment disparities but also help partially explain how these dis-
parities change during recessions. In support of this argument,
Engemann and Wall (2009) find the role of educational
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attainment in determining job losses across demographic
groups to be almost as important as industrial segregation
during the Great Recession. Their findings show Black men,
for whom average education tends to be lower than for Black
women or Whites, saw the largest decrease in employment.
In studies emphasizing the differences in human capital
and group preferences, occupational and industrial segrega-
tion emerge as the distinctive channel through which reces-
sions have disproportionate employment consequences for
different groups. Changes in occupational and industrial seg-
regation patterns over time are also partially responsible for
the changes in the unemployment gap betweenmen and wom-
en. Especially since the 1980s, women’s unemployment has
displayed a less cyclical trend than that of men, resulting in
lower unemployment rates for women during recessions.
Hoynes et al. (2012), for example, find that the impact of the
Great Recession was felt most strongly for men in general, and
Black and Hispanic workers specifically, due to the variation
in cyclicality across different industries. However, human
capital and comparative advantage are not the only factors
resulting in occupational segregation. Social norms regarding
appropriate occupations may differ between groups; legal and
institutional constraints may limit access of certain groups to
some occupations. Another possibility concerns severe em-
ployer discrimination in one industry or occupation than in
another.
Indeed, discrimination is at the core of the second main
approach mentioned in the literature on race and gender dis-
parities in labor market outcomes. These models are based on
what Becker calls “a taste for discrimination,” i.e., having a
prejudice against a group of people by employers, coworkers,
and customers (Altonji and Blank 1999). The empirical
models testing the role of discrimination in causing different
outcomes across gender/race/ethnicity use the control vari-
ables observable as labor supply characteristics and a dummy
variable for group identity. Then, the unexplained component
of the differential outcome is identified as discrimination. The
implication of discrimination theories for cyclical gendered
and/or racial unemployment disparities goes beyond occupa-
tional and industrial segregation channels. Regardless of in-
dustry, this approach hypothesizes that during expansions, the
gendered and/ or racial unemployment differential would be
reduced as employers find discrimination costlier. Likewise,
as argued by Couch and Fairlie (2010), during recessions, a
discriminating employer can lay off equally qualified Blacks
and not face economic costs for doing so. There is indeed
evidence to support this in empirical literature: the seminal
work byRichard Freeman (1973) about racial patterns of labor
market status from 1948 to 1972 shows that the level of em-
ployment for Blacks was more volatile than for Whites, and
the unemployment rate for Blacks rises more than for Whites
when the economy weakens, suggesting a “last in, first out”
pattern of Black employment over the business cycle.
However, the empirical evidence for the “last in, first out”
hypothesis does not seem to be conclusive for all time
periods and racial groups. Bradbury (2000) does find evidence
that disadvantaged groups experience larger percentage-point
declines in unemployment rates than their counterparts in
advantaged groups during the expansionary periods within
1972–1990. In testing this hypothesis for the period of
1989–2004, Couch and Fairlie (2010) find considerable evi-
dence that Black men are the first to be fired during down-
turns, and no evidence to confirm a last-hired claim. Couch
et al. (2016) test the hypothesis for the period of 1996–2012
and find both Blacks and Hispanics to be fired first. For 1976–
2016, Cajner et al. (2017) find that both Black and Hispanic
men and women are affected by recessions relatively more
than Whites on average. They show that whereas the
Hispanic/White unemployment gap can largely be explained
by differences in educational attainment, the more substantial
Black/White unemployment gap cannot be explained by ob-
servable characteristics. They conclude that personal and in-
stitutional discrimination can be responsible from the unex-
plained component for the unemployment gap for Blacks.
As the majority of the empirical literature on racial and
gender disparities in labor market outcomes has focused on
differences for either race or gender groups, there has been a
recent call for intersectional analysis. Grown and Tas (2011),
for instance, caution against labeling the Great Recession as a
“man-cession,” hence undermining its adverse influence on
women, which can be identified through the examination of
multiple labor market indicators and incorporation of race/
ethnicity into the analysis. Among the studies on the Great
Recession, Engemann and Wall (2009) is another example
noting that the differences in unemployment across racial cat-
egories are intertwined with differences across other catego-
ries, such as gender and education. As another example,
Kondo (2015) studies the intersectional differential effects of
unemployment at labor market entry on subsequent wages.
Paul et al. (2018) examines the gender and race wage gaps
and demonstrates that, in addition to discrimination based
solely on the singular identities such as race and gender, some
groups face compounded nonlinear discriminatory penalties,
which highlights the importance of intersectional analysis.
A cursory look at the evolution of unemployment rates in
Fig. 1 for combined racial/ethnic/gender categories over the last
two decades is sufficient to elucidate the need for studying
unemployment differentials across these groups at the intersec-
tion of race and gender. For example, the disappearance of the
gender gap in unemployment seems only valid for White men
vs White women, while the unemployment gap for Black men
and Black women displays a different pattern regardless of
business cycle phases.With the exception of 2006, Blackmen’s
unemployment rate has been persistently higher than Black
women’s. Conversely, Hispanic women’s unemployment has
been higher than Hispanic men’s for all but the 4 years of the
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Great Recession. While men’s unemployment across race and
ethnicity groups is higher than women’s during the Great
Recession, the change is the most dramatic for Blacks in terms
of percentage points. The gap between the unemployment rates
for White men and White women reaches 2.1% in 2009, the
highest in the last 30 years (from almost zero in 2006). For
Black men and women, the same gap is 4.4% in 2009, indicat-
ing that the Great “man-cession” was more severely felt by
Black men than White men. A motivation for our paper is to
explore whether similar asymmetries exist for different racial/
ethnic categories under the COVID-19 recession (to which the
term “she-cession” has been applied).
In this paper, we examine the differential impact of the
COVID-19 recession on unemployment by focusing on the in-
tersection of race and gender with a special emphasis on Black
and Hispanic women’s unemployment probabilities in relation
to other groups. Inspired by the intersectional feminist studies,
our work contributes to the empirical economic literature that
attributes discrimination to group differences—after accounting
for all the observable labormarket characteristics—by providing
a case study of unemployment during the COVID-19-induced
recession. Even though our current methodology is not able to
determine the qualitative reasons for the unique experience of
minority women, we explicitly attempt to capture the racialized
and gendered outcomes of COVID-19 on unemployment by
controlling for variables that exhaust the potential explanations
related to labor supply qualifications and industrial or occupa-
tional segregation.
Racialized-Gendered Unemployment
Under the COVID-19 Recession
Within the rapidly evolving literature focusing on COVID-19
and labor market outcomes, a handful of studies examine the
differences in the unemployment experiences of demographic
groups. In this section, while reviewing their findings, we also
discuss the unique characteristics of the current recession with
consequences for the unemployment of different groups.
One conclusive finding of these studies is that unlike a
“regular” recession, social distancing policies have had a larg-
er effect on women’s unemployment (Alon et al. 2020).
Adams-Prassl et al. (2020) present similar findings for both
the US and the UK: women and workers without a college
degree are significantly more likely to have lost their jobs.
Using February and April CPS surveys, Cowan (2020) shows
that, conditional on being employed in February, women are
less likely than men, and all racial minorities are less likely
than Whites, to be employed in April. And controlling for
occupation and industry, the effect is particularly large for
Black workers (3.5% more likely). Fairlie et al. (2020), on
the other hand, suggest that compared with the Great
Recession, Blacks did not experience a disproportionately
large increase in unemployment relative to Whites, while
Hispanic workers did. Similarly, Montenovo et al. (2020) find
large increases in recent unemployment among women,
Hispanics, and younger workers. While our work relates to
these studies, by using intersectional categories of race/
ethnicity and gender, we are able to examine whether the
disproportionate likelihood of unemployment for women
found in these works is an equally shared experience for
White, Black, and Hispanic women. Similarly, we address
the question of whether there are gendered differences within
minority groups in terms of the disproportionate unemploy-
ment effects reported above.
As suggested by the theories reviewed in the “What We
KnowAbout Racial and Gender Gaps in Unemployment Over
the Business Cycle” section, the asymmetric impact of the
COVID-19 recession on various industries and occupations
has been identified as the primary factor determining the gen-
dered and racialized impact of unemployment. However, in-
dustries and occupations affected during the current recession
partly differ from those affected during the previous reces-
sions. With essential/non-essential classification of industries,
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Fig. 1 Unemployment rate of
race/ethnicity-gender groups
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cyclical came to a complete halt, while certain typically cycli-
cal manufacturing industries continued to operate. In their
study of “essential” industries (based on executive orders from
California and Maryland), McNicholas and Poydock (2020)
use a CPS database to show that women make up the majority
of essential workers in healthcare (76%) and government- and
community-based services (73%), whereas people of color
make up the majority of essential workers in food and agri-
culture (50%) and in industrial, commercial, and residential
facilities and services (53%). Using data from the American
Community Survey for the period of 2014-2018 Rho et al.
(2020) show that women and people of color are overrepre-
sented in workforce employed in “front-line” industries (e.g.,
grocery stores, public transit, and healthcare). Considering the
fact that most workers in essential or “front-line” industries
have kept their jobs (as confirmed byMontenovo et al. 2020),
the higher likelihood of unemployment reported for women
andminorities presents a perplexing question. In our empirical
analyses of the determinants of COVID-related unemploy-
ment, we control for essential/non-essential industry classifi-
cation based on the state of Delaware’s criteria, as done by
Fairlie et al. (2020).3 7 To control for the disproportionate
effects of the COVID-19 recession on different segments of
the economy, we also include occupation and industry
categories.
Another highly emphasized determinant of pandemic-related
unemployment has been whether workers can work from home.
Among the growing number of studies measuring the feasibility
of working from home, Adams-Prassl et al. (2020) show that
workers who report they can do a high share of tasks from home
are substantially less likely to report losing their jobs due to the
COVID-19 outbreak in both the US and the UK. Dingel and
Neiman (2020), who use the occupational descriptions from the
Occupational Information Network (O*NET) surveys to desig-
nate any given occupation as able or unable to be performed at
home, estimate that 37% of jobs in the USA “can plausibly be
performed from home.”4 Based on their occupational classifica-
tion, they also show that there is significant variation in the share
of teleworkable jobs across industries. As expected, most jobs in
finance, corporate management, and professional and scientific
services could plausibly be performed at home, whereas very
few jobs in agriculture, hotels and restaurants, or retail can be.5
Using survey data, Brynjolfsson et al. (2020) find the fraction of
workers who switched to working from home by May 2020 to
be about 35.2%, not far off of Dingel and Neiman’s (2020)
estimate. Likewise, Bartik et al. (2020) find that the Dingel and
Neiman’s classification of work-from-home capacity is indeed a
strong predictor of industry-level variation in remote workability
during the pandemic. Dingel and Neiman’s (2020) classification
has been influential both in research and in practice as a way to
understand the potential for remote work across industries and
demographic groups. Using this measure, Yasenov (2020)
shows that lower-wage workers are up to three times less likely
to be able to work from home than higher-wage workers. Those
with lower levels of education, younger adults, ethnic minorities,
and immigrants are also concentrated in occupations that are less
likely to be performed from home. Whereas the opportunity to
telework would reduce the likelihood of unemployment, to the
extent that women and minorities are underrepresented in these
industries, high teleworkability might not provide any benefit to
these groups. Having shown that a lower share of women are
employed in highly teleworkable occupations in comparison to
occupations with a low degree of teleworkability, Alon et al.
(2020) suggest that “more women potentially face loss of em-
ployment” in these less teleworkable jobs.
We use Dingel and Neiman’s (2020) measure of the share of
teleworkable jobs in an industry as an industry-specific deter-
minant of unemployment. On the surface, there seems to be a
negative correlation between the share of employment by peo-
ple of color and the measure of teleworking opportunities in an
industry. Almost all industries in which Blacks and Latinx are
overrepresented have a lower-than-average share of
teleworkable jobs.6 As for the industry-specific shocks induced
by the COVID-19 pandemic, more layoffs are likely to occur in
industries with fewer teleworkable jobs, leading to a higher
likelihood of unemployment for Blacks and Latinx. This pat-
tern is not as clear for women, since women are also overrep-
resented in education and social assistance, both being indus-
tries with higher-than average teleworkable jobs. This ambigu-
ity confirms the need for intersectional analysis of the differen-
tials in the likelihood of unemployment during the pandemic.
Data on COVID-19 Unemployment
We use April 2020 CPS survey data to conduct our analysis of
the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the probability of
being unemployed in the USA and how race and gender3 The Delaware’s full list can be accessed at the link https://coronavirus.
delaware.gov/resources-for-businesses/.
4 As they note in their paper, this measure neglects many characteristics that
would make working from home difficult. Therefore, it is an upper-bound on
what might be feasible. Dingel and Neiman (2020) develop an alternative
measure based on individual introspection of different occupations, which
leads to a relatively conservative estimate of teleworkable jobs.
5 While beyond the scope of the paper, it is important to note that
teleworkability has many other determinants than the nature of tasks accom-
plished on the job. Firm-level differences in ability to invest and train em-
ployees and spatial differences in infrastructure are among these reasons.
6 Based on the BLS Labor Force Statistics in 2019, menmade up 47%,Whites
77.8%, African Americans 12.7%, and Latinx 18% of the US labor force.
Industries included here are those with highest share of employment for wom-
en, Black, and Latinx among 73 industry categories (based on NAICS 2 and
NAICS 3 classification) that we matched to Dingel and Neiman’s measure of
the share of teleworkable jobs in an industry. We used the relatively conser-
vative measure of teleworkability, which was described in footnote 13. The
unweighted average of teleworkability index for all 73 industries in our sample
is 30%.
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contribute to this probability. Most of the states which imple-
mented lockdown measures began to do so in March 2020, so
April is the first month to fully display the effects of COVID-
19 on the labor market. The reference period is April 12–18,
2020. We use a narrow and a broad measure of COVID-19
unemployment in order to account for a misspecification issue
that BLS warns users of CPS with the unemployment data
collected in March and April 2020, which leads to an under-
estimation of the national unemployment rate.7, 8
1) Narrow COVID-19 unemployment: Individuals, identi-
fied as “job losers on layoff” (BLS category), whose un-
employment duration is up to and including 4 weeks, are
included in this category. This is a rather conservative
definition of unemployment, which results in 10.5 million
unemployed due to COVID-19.
2) Upper-bound COVID-19 unemployed: In addition to the
individuals in the narrow category, we include “other job
losers” whose unemployment duration is up to and in-
cluding 4 weeks, those with ending temporary jobs whose
unemployment duration is up to and including 4 weeks,
and those who were “employed-but-absent” due to “oth-
er” reasons in the reference week that BLS identified as
misclassified. This measure results in 18.6 million
unemployed.
Table 1 presents a racial/ethnic-gender snapshot of the pool
of COVID-19 unemployed based on the narrow definition of
unemployment. The table shows that 26% percent of the un-
employed are White men and 29% are White women.
Compared to the shares of White men and White women in
the labor force (44% and 38%, respectively), these figures
confirm that Whites are underrepresented among the unem-
ployed. Similarly, the fact that 55% of the unemployed are
women, as compared to women making up 49% of the labor
force, signals the overrepresentation of women among the
unemployed. Age and education levels are among the other
noteworthy COVID-19-unemployment characteristics: rela-
tively younger people aged 21–30 make up the largest age
group (27%), and, in terms of educational attainment, high
school graduates represent the largest share of the unemployed
at 55.3%.
In terms of occupational distribution, we see that 14% of
the unemployed are in food preparation and related
occupations, followed by 11.3% in sales and related occupa-
tions. A closer look reveals that from among food preparation
and related occupations, 24.3% are waiters and waitresses,
and 20.7% are cooks. 41.5% of sales and related occupations
are retail salespersons, and 20.9% are cashiers. In terms of the
industrial distribution of the unemployed, we see that leisure
and hospitality comes first at 22%; educational and health
services follow at 17.5%; and wholesale and retail trade is a
close third at 15.8%. Agriculture, mining, public administra-
tion, information, and financial activities are among the sec-
tors with lowest numbers of unemployed (less than 2%).
Regression and Results
We use the April 2020 CPS micro data to examine how the
intersection of race/ethnicity and gender contribute to the
probability of being unemployed due to the COVID-19 pan-
demic in the US labor market. In our analysis, we use both
narrow and upper-bound unemployment measures (as previ-
ously defined). In addition to race/ethnicity gender, we in-
clude labor supply characteristics such as age and educational
attainment as control variables that might affect an individ-
ual’s probability of becoming unemployed. We use control
variables to capture the differential impact of the COVID-19
recession on different sectors and occupations, as well as the
different responses of the state governments across different
regions. Finally, we include industry-specific essential/non-
essential distinctions made by most state governments and
the share of teleworkable jobs in industries among control
variables with potential impact on the probability of
unemployment.
Our benchmark model takes the following form:
Prob Xð Þ ¼ Φ β0X þ u
 
where,
unempi ¼ 1 if the individual is unemployed due to COVID−190 otherwise

7 The BLS instructed surveyors to code those out of work due to the epidemic
as recently laid off or unemployed, but surveyors appeared to code at least
some of them in the employed-but-absent category. According to the estimates
provided by BLS, out of 11.5 million workers classified as employed-but-
absent in April 2020, around 7.5 million should have been classified as unem-
ployed. If these people were to be coded as unemployed, the resulting unem-
ployment rate for April would be 19.2%, compared with the official estimate
of 14.4% (not seasonally adjusted).
8 We base our analysis on working age population (15–64). Individuals who
report themselves as out of the labor force are excluded from this analysis.




White 0.26 0.29 0.55
Black 0.07 0.07 0.14
Hispanic 0.12 0.11 0.23
Other 0.04 0.04 0.08
Total 0.49 0.51 1
F(2.96, 9214.62) = 2.18, p = 0.09.
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Φ is the standard normal cumulative distribution and X is
the vector of following independent variables:
& Variable showing the race/ethnicity-gender intersection
(six categories of White men, White women, Black men,
Black women, Hispanic men, Hispanic women)
& Control variables: age and square of age, educational at-
tainment (four categories of less than high school or high
school, associate degree, college degree, advanced de-
gree), variable for the degree of teleworkability in an in-
dustry expressed as percentage of jobs that can be worked
from home, a dummy variable indicating whether the in-
dustry is essential or not, variable for 23 occupations,9
variable for 14 sectors,10 variable for four regions
(Northeast, Southwest, Midwest, West).11
β′ is the parameter estimates, and u is the random error
term. The parameters of particular interest are those of the
“race/gender” variable as they capture the disproportionate
effect estimates of COVID-19 unemployment on various in-
tersectional groups. Table 2 shows the summary statistics for
the variables.
Table 3 shows the marginal effects from the probit regres-
sion results for both narrow and upper-bound unemployment
measures.12
Compared with White men, all race/ethnicity-gender
groups have a higher probability of being unemployed, and
the coefficients are statistically significant in both models 1
and 2. Furthermore, in both specifications, the probability of
being unemployed is higher for women in each race/ethnicity
category. As expected, the largest probability of unemploy-
ment in comparison to that of White men is for Hispanic
women, followed by Black women (in both models). For
Hispanic women, we see that holding these multiple identities
increases the probability of unemployment by 5% compared
with White men (using the upper-bound unemployment defi-
nition). The fact that Black women and Hispanic women ex-
perience the highest probability controlling for labor supply
characteristics and labor market positions including COVID-
19-specific variables suggests that already existing gendered
and racial inequalities are reinforced by the COVID-19 pan-
demic as intersectional feminists would claim. Comparing
narrow and upper-bound unemployment results shows that
the probabilities from the latter are always higher for each
racial/ethnic-gender group. That the smallest discrepancy be-
tween the results from narrow and upper-bound unemploy-
ment measures is for White women might suggest that the
misclassification of unemployment is most predominant for
people of color.
As expected, unemployment probability decreases with
higher educational attainment, yet only after a college degree,
an associate degree does not insulate one from being unem-
ployed compared with high school graduates.13 Also, as ex-
pected, the probability of unemployment is lower for essential
industries. Based on the upper-bound definition of unemploy-
ment, the likelihood of becoming unemployed seems to drop
by 10% in essential industries compared to those classified as
non-essential. Finally, the teleworkability variable also has a
negative marginal effect as expected: as the percentage of jobs
that can be done from home in an industry increases, the
probability of being unemployed falls.
Given that being employed in an industry with more
teleworkable jobs can lead, on average, to a lower probability
of being unemployed, we next explore whether this advantage
is enjoyed by all race/ethnicity-gender categories uniformly.
To do so, we incorporate an interaction term of race/ethnicity
gender and the degree of teleworkability to models 1 and 2.
Table 4 shows the marginal effects of the race/ethnicity-
gender intersection for the highest level of teleworkability in
our dataset.
The marginal effects in Table 4 show that even when the
share of teleworkable jobs is at a maximum in an industry, the
unemployment probability for Black women and Hispanic
women is higher than that of White men regardless of unem-
ployment definition. The disproportionate likelihood is quite
sizeable based on the upper-bound unemployment measure:
Black women are 6% more likely to be unemployed than
White men, and Hispanic women are 7% more likely to be
9 The occupational categories are management occupations, business and fi-
nancial operations, computer and mathematical science, architecture and en-
gineering occupations, life, physical and social science, community and social
service occupations, legal occupations, education, training and library occupa-
tions, arts, design entertainment and sports, healthcare practitioner and techni-
cians, healthcare support occupations, protective service occupations, food
preparation and serving-related occupations, building and grounds cleaning
occupations, personal care and service occupations, sales and related occupa-
tions, office and administrative support occupations, farming, fishing and for-
estry occupations, construction and extraction occupations, installation, main-
tenance and repair occupations, production occupations, transportation and
material moving and armed forces.
10 The categories are agriculture, mining, construction, manufacturing, whole-
sale and retail trade, transportation and utilities, information, financial activi-
ties, professional and business services, educational and health services, leisure
and hospitality, other services, public administration, and armed forces.
11 The CPS dataset does provide more comprehensive lists of occupations and
industries defined at more detailed level. However, to prevent a potential
incidental parameter problem in nonlinear models with group effects, such
as occupations, industries, and regions we use here, we limited ourselves to
the current detail levels. Introducing these effects with higher detail level
would increase the number of parameters to levels with insufficient number
of observations in some cases.
12 Logit and OLS regression estimations of the benchmark model also give
similar results.
13 When we do not control for occupation or industry category, we see that the
coefficient of educational attainment category of associate degree becomes
significant. Hence, we can state that occupational distribution overlaps with
educational attainment for lower educational attainment categories, in the
sense that those who have a higher unemployment probability are concentrated
in occupational categories that employ relatively lower educational attainment
than a college degree.
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unemployed than White men within industries that have the
highest degree of teleworkability. Although smaller, a
significant disproportionate likelihood of unemployment also
exists for Hispanic men, but only based on the upper-bound
Table 2 Summary statistics
Variable Mean St. deviation Min Max Type
Unemploymentnarrow 0.05 0.22 0 1 Dummy
Unemploymentupper-bound 0.09 0.28 0 1 Dummy
Race/gender 2.63 1.70 1 6 Categorical
Teleworkability 33.7 24.7 1.8 88.04 Continuous
Occupation 11.8 6.9 1 23 Categorical
Sector 7.8 3.07 1 14 Categorical
Education 1.89 1.11 1 4 Categorical
Age 39.7 14.15 15 64 Continuous
Essential 0.74 0.43 0 1 Dummy
Region 2.69 1.01 1 4 Categorical
Sample size 63,474
Individuals are weighted using composited final monthly weights provided by the BLS
Table 3 Probit marginal effects
from benchmark model Model 1 Model 2
Unemploymentnarrow Unemploymentupper-bound
Race/gender






















(reference category: less than
high school or high school)


























Sample size 34,652 34,968
The dependent variable for model 1 is narrow unemployment (0,1) and for model 2 is upper-bound unemploy-
ment (0,1). The sample formodel 1 is composed of those who are unemployed by narrow definition and employed
workers. The sample for model 2 is composed of those who are unemployed by upper-bound definition and
employed workers. Standard errors are in parentheses. All regressions use composited final monthly weights
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unemployment measure. Finally, the higher likelihood of un-
employment that White women and Black men were previ-
ously shown to have experienced relative toWhite men seems
to disappear if they are employed in industries with highly
teleworkable jobs. The top five industries with the highest
share of teleworkable jobs are in the information and the fi-
nance and insurance sectors of the economy. Being employed
in these sectors seems to have insulated White women from
the disproportionate unemployment effects of the COVID-19
recession.
Concluding Remarks
Our analysis shows that controlling for labor supply character-
istics, geographical regions, occupations, sectors of the econo-
my, essential/non-essential classification, and the degree of
teleworkability of industries, women and minorities have been
disproportionately affected by COVID-19 in terms of job
losses. While we introduce a more comprehensive framework
with these control variables, our findings overall are in line with
the recent literature on the current recession’s initial effects on
the unemployment of women andminorities. As a case of study
of the COVID-19 recession, our work is a contribution to the
empirical literature testing the discrimination theories based on
the unexplained gap after accounting for observable character-
istics of women, men, and different races/ethnicities and their
labor market positions. Furthermore, informed by the feminist
theorists, who emphasize the role of socialization and the com-
bination of race and gender in creating unique experiences in
the labor market, we also contribute to the smaller strand of
literature that calls for an intersectional lens to analyze the labor
market outcomes of women of color.
In our analysis, we find that the most disadvantaged group is
Hispanic women, who are 5.3% more likely to be
unemployed—followed by Black women, who have 4.4%
higher likelihood—as compared to White men, based on an
upper-bound unemployment definition; and Hispanic men have
the smallest disproportionate unemployment probability com-
pared to White men, with a 2.3% higher likelihood. We further
Table 4 Marginal effects at
maximum level of teleworkability Probit regression marginal effects when teleworkability = 88.1
Model 3 Model 4
Narrow unemployment Upper-bound unemployment
Race/ethnicity and gender































Sample size 34,652 34,968
The dependent variable for model 3 is narrow unemployment (0,1) and for model 4 is upper-bound unemploy-
ment (0,1). The sample formodel 3 is composed of those who are unemployed by narrow definition and employed
workers. The sample for model 4 is composed of those who are unemployed by upper-bound definition and
employed workers. Standard errors are in parenthesis. All regressions use composited final monthly weights
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find that working in an industry with highly teleworkable jobs
does not spare Hispanic women and Black women from dispro-
portionate job losses. Hispanic women working in industries
with a high degree of ability to work from home are 7% more
likely, and Black women are 6% more likely, to become unem-
ployed compared to White men. It appears that the pandemic is
affecting the already built-in racial/ethnic and gendered structural
disparities in the labor market in an even more pronounced way,
especially for women of color. As we control for industry and
occupation categories, which has been suggested as the one of
the main mechanisms through which recessions disproportion-
ately impact demographic groups’ unemployment, the remain-
ing differences suggest the role of unobservable factors, includ-
ing discrimination.
We know from the existing literature that discrimination in
hiring and firing practices has been identified as a source of
unemployment of Black workers, as it fits into a “last-hired,
first-fired” pattern. Empirical studies testing the existence of
this pattern during previous recessions showed that beyond
layoffs based on observable characteristics, a discriminating
employer can lay off equally qualified Blacks and not face
economic costs for doing so during downturns (Couch and
Fairlie 2010). In the current recession, this effect might have
been disadvantageous to Hispanic and Black women.
Discrimination is also suggested to cause lower probability
of on-the-job-training for women, rendering them more ex-
pandable during layoffs (Royalty 1996). To the extent that this
effect is larger for women of color, this could explain the
higher probability of being laid off during the COVID-19
recession. As more data become available, combined with
more qualitative studies, we might be able to understand the
additional hardship experienced by women and minorities
during the COVID-19 pandemic.
A crucial aspect of the current recession that is affecting
the labor supply decisions of mothers and single parents is
the ongoing childcare crisis in the USA due to the closure
of daycare centers and schools since March 2020. For dual-
earner heterosexual parents, the already existing unequal
distribution of time spent on child-care is likely to be ex-
acerbated by the pandemic. This increased time strain on
women and single parents is likely to result in women
leaving employment and even exiting the labor force.14
The results of the US Census Bureau’s Household Pulse
Survey Phase II, conducted in July 2020, already show that
one in five working-age adults states the reason they were
not working was because COVID-19 disrupted their
childcare arrangements. Of those not working, women ages
25–44 are almost three times as likely as men to not be
working due to childcare demands. Since our emphasis in
this work is on the unemployment probability for
intersectional groups, our sample does not include individ-
uals who exit the labor force due to childcare responsibil-
ities.15 As time use data become available in the future,
researchers will be able to explore the impact of the
COVID-19 recession specifically on mothers’ time alloca-
tion among unpaid and paid work.
Another reason for the higher probability of unemployment
for people of color could be the relative difficulty minority-
owned businesses have experienced in securing Paycheck
Protection Program (PPP) loans. These loans are designed to
provide an additional incentive for small businesses to keep
their employees on payroll during this recession, and although
we do not have any access to data showing who received PPP
loans, several surveys conducted by various NGOs point to
Black and Latinx small businesses having difficulty receiving
these loans. UnidosUS, for example, reports that only 1 in 10
minority-owned businesses was able to get the funds they
asked for.16
In addition to PPP loans, a federally legislated fiscal impe-
tus program, the CARES Act passed inMarch 2020, provided
Economic Impact Payments to American households of up to
$1200 per adult for individuals whose income was less than
$99,000. As the US unemployment rate now stands at 11.1%,
it is obvious that this one-shot stimulus payment will not be
enough for women and minority workers to maintain their
livelihoods. Under the CARES Act, the Pandemic
Unemployment Compensation program added a $600 weekly
boost to unemployment insurance payments, but this was ter-
minated at the end of July 2020. Given that minorities and
women are disproportionately affected by this recession, and
Black, Latinx, and low-income households have less access to
liquid assets (Ganong et al. 2020), the question remains as to
how these workers have weathered the expiration of this pro-
gram.17 In our opinion, a revitalization of this program is
critical for the well-being of the minority population and
women.
Compliance with Ethical Standards




15 A recent study by Heggeness (2020) uses monthly panel data from the CPS
to compare labor market attachment, non-work activity, hours worked, of
those in areas with early school closures and stay-in-place orders with those
in areas with delayed or no pandemic closures. While there was no immediate
impact on detachment or unemployment, she finds mothers with jobs in early
closure states were 53.2% more likely than mothers in late closure states to
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